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Prior literature examines consequences (e.g., negative market reactions, higher subsequent audit 
fees, and debt covenant violations) audit clients face arising from missed regulatory due dates. 
These clients likely pressure the auditor to provide additional resources to perform the audit. 
This paper examines whether an audit office resource allocation shock stemming from late-filing 
clients is associated with the audit quality of the other timely-filing clients in that audit office. I 
find that timely-filing clients are more likely to subsequently restate their financial statements 
when there are late-filing clients in the same audit office. Using audit fees as a proxy for auditor 
effort (resource allocation), I also find evidence consistent with auditors allocating resources 
from timely-filing clients to late-filing clients. Subsequent tests indicate that office size mitigates 
the association between late-filing clients and audit quality of the timely-filing clients. Taken 
together, these findings support the argument that the observed relation between misstatements 
and late-filing clients can be linked, at least in part, to the implications of shocks to office-level 
resource allocation plans. Thus, my findings highlight an important factor for auditors to 
consider for their client acceptance and continuance decisions. These findings also have 
implications for standard setters considering the costs associated with regulatory due dates.
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The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires all registrants to complete their 
10-K filings within 60 to 90 days of their fiscal year-ends.1 Missing these due dates can have 
severe consequences for the registrant, including negative market reactions (Alford, Jones, and 
Zmijewski, 1994; Dee, Hillison, and Pacini, 2010; Bartov and Konchitchki, 2017; Khalil, Mansi, 
Mazboudi, and Zhang, 2017), higher subsequent audit fees (Wang, Raghunandan, and McEwan, 
2013), and debt covenant violations (Chapman, Hyatte, and Jindra, 2015; Bartov and 
Konchitchki, 2017). Because the consequences of missing regulatory due dates are significant for 
the registrant, I posit that both the registrant and the auditor plan to file the 10-K in a timely 
manner. Thus, it is likely that late-filing clients negatively affect the audit office via a shock to 
office-level resource allocation plans.2 
In this paper, I examine whether a resource allocation shock stemming from late-filing 
clients is associated with audit quality for the other timely-filing clients in an audit office. 
Because late-filing clients face significant negative consequences, they are likely to explicitly or 
implicitly pressure the auditor to invest additional resources to perform the audit. The investment 
of additional resources, in turn, could result in lower audit quality for other clients in the office 
that serve as the source of additional resources.3 Although prior work has investigated client-
specific implications of filing late, my study is the first to consider the potential implications 
late-filing clients have on other clients in the audit office. 
                                                          
1 Non-accelerated, accelerated, and large accelerated filer due dates are 90, 75, and 60 days after registrants’ fiscal 
year-ends, respectively. 
2 Throughout this paper, I use late-filing client, late filer, and non-timely filer interchangeably and use timely-filing 
client and timely filer interchangeably. 
3 Audit firms might anticipate “fire drills” related to late-filing clients and build in enough resource slack to address 
unplanned circumstances. However, because resource slack is expensive, audit firms might not have enough. 
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Following prior research (Wang et al., 2013; Bartov and Konchitchki, 2017; Khalil et al., 
2017), I use Form 12b-25 to identify late-filing clients.4 I restrict my main sample to companies 
with fiscal year-ends that fall during the typical busy season (i.e., mid-December through mid-
January), and that file their 10-K in a timely manner. I construct two variables that reflect office-
level resource allocation shocks associated with late filings: 1) the percentage of late-filing 
clients in the office; and 2) the size-weighted percentage of late-filing clients in the office. 
To proxy for the audit quality of timely-filing clients, I use material misstatements, as 
revealed by subsequent restatements (see, e.g., Choudhary, Merkley, and Schipper, 2016; 
Aobdia, 2017, 2018), announced in a Form 8-K. I regress material misstatements on my proxies 
for office-level resource allocation shocks and controls for client, audit firm, and audit office 
characteristics that prior literature shows to be associated with audit quality. 
Consistent with my prediction, I find a positive and significant association between the 
likelihood of a material misstatement for timely-filing clients and the percentage of late-filing 
clients in the office using both proxies. These results suggest that office-level resource allocation 
shocks from late-filing clients have implications for other clients in the office – namely, clients 
that file their financial statements in a timely manner. 
My main findings suggest that auditors do not devote sufficient resources to timely-filing 
clients in order to maintain a consistent level of audit quality. To supplement these findings, I 
perform tests to examine whether a similar shift in resources is evident in the amount of audit 
fees paid by timely-filing clients. I examine audit fees because they are an important input into 
the audit process (DeFond and Zhang, 2014) and a reasonable proxy for auditor effort (Lobo and 
                                                          
4 If an SEC registrant cannot file its annual report on time, the registrant must file Form 12b-25 no later than one day 
past their due date in order to notify regulators and investors that they will file their 10-K at a later date. Form 12b-
25 filings related to 10-Ks are labeled NT 10-K on Edgar. By filing its 10-K within 15 days of the due date, the 
registrant avoids SEC penalties. 
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Zhao, 2013). I regress audit fees on my variables of interest and find a negative and significant 
association between audit fees for timely-filing clients and both proxies for the percentage of 
late-filing clients in that office. Furthermore, I find that late-filing clients pay higher audit fees in 
the year they file late. These results, taken together, suggest that audit offices allocate resources 
from timely-filing clients to late-filing clients. 
I perform several additional tests to support my argument that the observed relation 
between material misstatements and late-filing clients can be linked to shocks to office-level 
resource allocation plans. I begin by examining whether my primary results are mitigated by 
office size. Because larger audit offices have a larger pool of resources to draw from, I expect 
larger audit offices to better allocate resources to late-filing clients without adversely impacting 
audit quality for timely-filing clients. To test this, I re-estimate my primary analyses and interact 
my proxies for resource allocation shocks with two proxies for office size (client count and 
office-level audit fees). The results of my primary tests are mitigated as audit office size 
increases, suggesting that larger audit offices are better able to adjust to resource allocation 
shocks. 
Next, I investigate whether my results are driven primarily by timely-filing clients that 
operate in the same industry as the late-filing clients. When faced with a late-filing client, I 
expect audit offices to first secure resources with relevant experience and knowledge (i.e., 
personnel from the same industry). This suggests that the effects of resource allocation shocks 
should be more pronounced among clients from the same industry as the late-filing clients. The 
results suggest that resource allocation shocks affect both same- and different-industry clients, 
regardless of industry. 
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In my next test, I explore whether my primary results are more pronounced when 
resources are more limited. The implications of resource allocation shocks should be more 
pronounced in the busiest quarter (i.e., the fourth quarter) and weaker in the other three. In an 
expanded sample, the fourth calendar quarter has the highest concentration of client fiscal year-
ends, with 14,625 observations, followed by the first, second, and third quarters, with 952, 1,225, 
and 799 observations, respectively. Thus, I expect my results to be more pronounced with 
increased concentration of fiscal year-ends. To test this, I re-estimate my primary analyses using 
samples of companies from each calendar quarter. I reconstruct my variables of interest to 
account for late-filing clients by calendar quarter. I then estimate separate regressions for each 
quarter. I find that clients with fiscal year-ends in the second and fourth calendar quarters have a 
positive and significant relation between the likelihood of a material misstatement and both 
proxies for the percentage of late-filing clients. However, I do not find statistically significant 
differences between any coefficients for the percentage of late filings in any quarters. These 
results provide weak evidence that my results are more pronounced during the busiest times of 
the year. 
I next examine whether missing expected filing dates similarly places pressure on the 
auditor to complete the audit. Prior research finds that missing expected filing dates results in 
negative abnormal returns (Chambers and Penman, 1984). If the client pressures the auditor to 
avoid such negative consequences, then a client that files later than expected, although still on 
time, might also pressure the auditor to invest additional resources in the audit. This would result 
in an auditor allocating resources from clients that would file when expected. I use a sample of 
observations consisting of clients without late filers in their office that file when expected and re-
measure my variables of interest using only the percentage of clients that miss their expected 
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filing date. I find lower audit quality for clients that file on the expected date as both proxies for 
the percentage of clients that miss their expected filing dates increases. This is consistent with 
auditors allocating resources in response to client pressure stemming from negative 
consequences. 
Finally, I perform several tests to assess the robustness of my primary findings. I find 
similar results using alternative proxies for audit quality – discretionary accruals and combined 
material and immaterial misstatements. To alleviate concerns about the distributions of my 
variables of interest, I limit my sample to observations with late-filing clients in the audit office. 
The results are similar to my main findings. Next, I use Pregibon’s dbetas and leverage 
(Pregibon 1981) to eliminate influential observations, finding that influential observations are not 
driving my results. To ensure that my results are not driven by my proxy for late-filing (i.e., 
companies that file Form 12b-25), I re-measure my variables of interest by including the small 
number of clients that file later than the SEC regulatory due dates yet do not file Form 12b-25, 
finding similar results as my main analyses. 
This study provides four primary contributions. First, I contribute to the literature on 
regulatory due dates and late filings. Prior literature examines the regulatory and market 
implications that late-filing clients face (Alford et al., 1994; Dee et al., 2010; Bartov and 
Konchitchki, 2017), the signals that late-filing clients provide (Cao, Chen, and Higgs, 2016), the 
change in the late-filing rate over time (Impink, Lubberink, van Praag, and Veenman, 2012; 
Boland, Bronson, and Hogan, 2015; Burke and Pakaluk, 2016), and the financial reporting 
implications of accelerated due dates (Krishnan and Yang, 2009; Impink et al., 2012; Boland et 
al., 2015; Lambert, Jones, Brazel, and Showalter, 2017). My study advances prior research by 
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demonstrating that the impact of late-filing clients extends to timely-filing clients in the same 
audit office. 
Second, I contribute to the literature on the implications of audit office resource 
constraints and time pressure. Prior literature examines constraints related to busy season 
concentration (Lopez and Peters, 2011, 2012), filing deadline concentration (Czerney, Jang, and 
Omer, 2017), and audit office growth (Bills, Swanquist, Whited, 2016). This paper shows that 
office-level resource constraints arise from late-filing clients. 
Third, I provide evidence of an office-level signal about audit quality that is easily 
determinable and often revealed sooner than alternative signals (e.g., misstatements). Many 
misstatements are revealed several months to several years after the 10-K filing. Form 12b-25 
filings are revealed during busy season. Although the implications of a revealed misstatement 
differ from those of Form 12b-25 (e.g., a misstatement might also imply low audit expertise, not 
only a resource allocation shock), Form 12b-25 is a potentially more timely indication of office-
level audit quality for investors, auditors, and regulators. 
Finally, my results highlight the importance of audit office resource allocation plans, 
resource slack, and late filings as relevant factors for auditors to consider when making client 
acceptance and continuance decisions. In particular, my results suggest that the average audit 
office has insufficient resource slack when faced with late filers, meaning that they are unable to 
respond to unexpected changes to resource allocation plans. This deficiency varies predictably 
with certain office characteristics that are influenced by client portfolio decisions. My results 
also underscore the importance of regulatory due dates and should inform standard setters and 
regulators when considering costs associated with regulatory due dates. 
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The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, I discuss prior literature and 
develop my hypotheses. In Section III, I describe my sample selection and research 
methodology. In Section IV, I present my primary results. In Section V, I present additional 
analyses. In Section VI, I perform robustness tests, and in Section VII, I conclude. 
 
II. BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
The SEC established 10-K filing due dates to ensure that companies provide financial 
information to the public in a timely manner. The SEC established Form 10-K due dates with the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. In order to fulfill the demand for more useful and timely 
information, the SEC subsequently tightened accelerated and large accelerated filer due dates 
with release number 33-8128 in September 2002 and number 33-8644 in December 2005. The 
SEC considers annual financial statements to be late if the registrant does not file within 60, 75, 
or 90 days after the fiscal year-end (for large accelerated filers, accelerated filers, and non-
accelerated filers, respectively). 
A registrant that cannot file by their due date must file a Form 12b-25 no later than one 
day past the due date to notify the SEC and investors that the financial statements will be filed 
late.5 At that point, the registrant has 15 days to file the 10-K before the financial statements are 
considered delinquent. On Form 12b-25, registrants indicate which form will be filed late (e.g., 
Form 10-K, Form 10-Q, Form 11-K, etc.), the period the form pertains to, and whether the 
registrant intends to file within the 15-day grace period. The registrant must also explain why it 
is unable to file within the prescribed time period. 
                                                          
5 Form 12b-25 can also be filed for quarterly reports. Because quarterly reports require much less work from the 
auditor’s perspective (i.e., they are reviewed, not audited), I focus on regulations pertaining to annual (10-K) filings. 
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Prior research examines trends in late filings, generally around the changes in the 
accelerated and large accelerated filer due dates. Impink et al. (2012) examine first-time late 
filers around both the new accelerated and large accelerated due date changes. They find that the 
number of accelerated filer late filings did not increase with the new accelerated filer due date. 
They do find some evidence, however, that the number of large accelerated filer late filings 
increased with the new large accelerated filing due date. This effect, however, is concentrated 
among companies that were involved in option backdating. Impink et al. (2012) also find that 
clients with material weaknesses are more likely to file late in the year after the implementation 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). Boland et al. (2015) examine the frequency of late 
filings and find that clients do not experience an increase in late filings around the tightened due 
dates. In their descriptive analyses, Burke and Pakaluk (2016) examine the trend in Form 12b-25 
filings and also find that the tightened due dates are not associated with an increased occurrence 
in late filings. Instead, they find that the total number of late filings has generally decreased since 
2005, but that late filings remain constant as a percentage of total public clients. 
To understand the prevalence of late filings, I graph the trend in non-timely filings (Form 
12b-25 for annual financial statements) by fiscal year in Figure 1. I provide trends for the 
number of public companies on Compustat, the number of annual Form 12b-25 late filings, and 
the percentage of public companies filing late. Consistent with prior research, I find that late 
filings have decreased in the years after SOX and have remained steady as a percentage of public 
companies since 2009.6 
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
                                                          
6 The exact years on the trends differ slightly from those of Burk and Pakaluk (2016). This is because I use fiscal 
years to keep dates comparable to my analyses while Burke and Pakaluk (2016) use calendar years. 
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SEC registrants have several strong incentives to avoid filing late. First, late-filing clients 
suffer valuation discounts and other adverse market-related outcomes. Alford et al. (1994) 
investigate companies that miss their 10-K filing due date and find negative abnormal returns for 
the average late-filing company. Dee et al. (2010) find that most late filings are associated with 
negative abnormal returns between the due date and the date when the financial statements are 
filed. Bartov and Konchitchki (2017) find that late filings result in short- and long-run negative 
abnormal returns and that the adverse market reaction increases with the amount of time it takes 
a client to file. This is even true for “benign” late annual filings filed within the SEC’s 15-day 
grace period. Finally, Khalil et al. (2017) examine the bond market reaction to late filings and 
find that abnormal bond returns are negative for late filers and, importantly, that this effect is 
incremental to the reaction to information about the late filer’s financial health. 
A second consequence for late-filing companies is higher audit fees. Wang et al. (2013) 
argue that Form 12b-25 filings signal a client’s inability to prepare financial information on a 
timely basis, resulting in more auditor effort and higher audit fees. Examining a sample of Form 
12b-25 filings, they find that late filers pay higher audit fees in the late-filing year and in the year 
after.  
A third potential consequence involves debt covenant violations. Chapman et al. (2015) 
discuss lenders’ demand for timely financial information and the use of due dates in debt 
covenants that are similar to those of the SEC. Consistent with this, Wang et al. (2013) and 
Bartov and Konchitchki (2017) surmise that late filings can trigger debt covenant violations and 
an increased cost of debt. 
In addition to the consequences identified by prior research, late-filing clients face 
potential regulatory consequences. The SEC has authority to revoke registration, suspend 
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trading, or bring civil and other administrative actions against registrants who do not comply 
with SEC regulations (including filing due dates). Such enforcement is typically reserved for 
egregiously late clients (e.g., those that file six months to a year late).7 However, until the proper 
forms are filed, any late filing precludes a client from filing any form under the Securities Acts 
of 1933. Some forms, like Form S-3 (i.e., “shelf registration”), require a registrant to file all 
forms on a timely basis for the 12 previous months.8 Additionally, many stock exchanges require 
their registrants to file their periodic reports on a timely basis and enforce those due dates. For 
example, NYSE rule 802.01E requires late filers to communicate the status of late filings with 
the exchange and to issue a press release disclosing the occurrence of the late filing. Late filers 
are monitored over a “cure period” until the late filing is submitted (NASDAQ rules 5250 and 
5810 impose similar requirements). 
Given the severity of the consequences of late filing, it is important to understand the 
circumstances that lead to late filings. Audit Analytics categorizes the explanations for late 
filings given in Part III on Form 12b-25. Based on its categorizations, the most common 
explanations are 1) Insufficient time without undue hardship, 2) Insufficient time to prepare or 
review report, distantly followed by 3) Auditor unable to complete review or audit not complete, 
4) Waiting on key information – inability to obtain, and 5) Internal control assessment issues. 
Less common explanations include insufficient personnel, tax issues, and asset impairment 
calculation difficulties. In addition, prior research finds that these explanations often reveal 
client-level problems (Alford et al., 1994; Bryant-Kutcher, Peng, and Zvinakis, 2007). These 
late-filing explanations suggest issues that could lead an audit office to allocate more resources 
                                                          
7 See, for example, the SEC’s justification for suspensions on the SEC’s Listing of Trading Suspensions at 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/suspensions.shtml. 
8 Form S-3 allows a registrant to more easily obtain additional capital. Consequently, by filing late, the late filer 
increases the cost of obtaining additional capital. 
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to late filers. Given the issues revealed in the explanations and the negative consequences late 
filers face, I expect the late-filing client to explicitly or implicitly pressure the auditor for more 
resources, likely adding to the time pressure for the audit office. I therefore develop my 
hypotheses on how audit offices respond to time pressure from missed regulatory due dates, 
drawing from prior literature on the implications of time pressure. 
In their review of forms of pressure in accounting, DeZoort and Lord (1997) find that 
time pressure compromises audit quality. McDaniel (1990) finds that auditors’ processing 
accuracy and sampling adequacy decrease as time pressure increases. Bennett, Hatfield, and 
Stefaniak (2015) find that auditors react to greater time pressure by conceding more on proposed 
audit adjustments. There are also several archival studies of the relation between factors related 
to time pressure and audit quality. Lopez and Peters (2011, 2012) find that clients with 
December year-ends (i.e., busy season) have lower audit quality and that heavier concentration 
of busy season companies within an audit office’s portfolio is associated with auditor switching. 
Bills et al. (2016) find that the initial years of office-level asset and fee growth, their proxies for 
resource constraints, impairs audit quality. Czerney et al. (2017) find that more concentrated due 
dates, measured with the Herfindahl index based on the mix of clients’ filing statuses in an audit 
office, result in lower audit quality. 
Based on the preceding discussion, I posit that auditors invest additional resources in late-
filing clients. Because resources are limited, this likely results in reduced resources for the audits 
of other clients. This, in turn, could result in greater time pressure and lower audit quality for the 
other clients in the office whose auditors serve as the source of additional resources. However, it 
is not obvious that a resource allocation shock stemming from late filings would lead to lower 
audit quality. Audit firms might anticipate resource allocation shocks and might build in enough 
12 
 
slack to respond to unplanned circumstances. Also, when resource allocation shocks occur, 
auditors are likely to pull resources from audits that are least likely to need those resources, 
which might result in no change to a timely-filing client’s overall audit quality. This discussion 
leads to my first hypothesis, stated in the alternative form: 
H1: Among timely-filing clients, audit quality is lower for offices with a larger proportion 
of late-filing clients. 
My first hypothesis builds on the idea that lower audit quality for timely-filing clients is 
the result of auditors allocating resources from them to the late-filing clients. To further support 
this idea, I examine how audit fees, an important input to the audit process (DeFond and Zhang, 
2014) and a reasonable proxy for auditor effort (Lobo and Zhao, 2013), are affected by late-filing 
clients. If auditors allocate fewer resources to timely-filing clients when there is a late-filing 
client in the office, I expect audit fees to be lower for timely-filing clients. This leads to my 
second hypothesis, stated in the alternative form: 
H2: Among timely-filing clients, audit fees are lower for offices with a larger proportion 
of late-filing clients. 
 
III. SAMPLE SELECTION, METHODOLOGY, AND VARIABLES OF INTEREST 
Sample Selection 
My sample period begins in fiscal year 2006 and ends in fiscal year 2013. I begin in 2006 
because the SEC implemented the tightened large accelerated filing due dates for fiscal year ends 
ending on December 15, 2006 or later. I end my sample in 2013 to allow sufficient time for the 
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identification and revelation (through restatements) of misstatements.9 My sample consists of all 
observations with required data from the Compustat North American Fundamentals Annual and 
Audit Analytics databases. Specifically, I obtain financial statement data from Compustat, 
auditor data from the Audit Analytics Audit Opinions database, misstatement data from the 
Audit Analytics Non-Reliance Restatements database, and Form NT 10-K filings from the Audit 
Analytics Non-timely Filer Information and Analysis database. I exclude banks and other 
financial institutions (observations with SIC codes from 6000 through 6999), companies with 
fiscal-year ends that are not during the typical busy season,10 companies without the required 
variables, and companies with less than $5 million in total assets (Bills et al., 2016; Shipman, 
Swanquist, and Whited 2016). Because I estimate logistic regressions, some industry-years have 
no variation in the material misstatement analyses, resulting in the exclusion of several 
observations. Finally, I exclude observations when the client files late because prior literature 
shows that such clients have lower financial reporting quality (Impink et al., 2012; Cao et al., 
2016). I use late-filing observations to create my variables of interest, but exclude them from 
analyses. My final sample for my first hypothesis consists of 14,107 client-year observations. 
The final sample for my second hypothesis is limited to observations that have audit fees, 
decreasing the sample to 14,073. Table 1 depicts the sample selection process. 
 (Insert Table 1 here) 
Methodology 
I investigate my first hypothesis by estimating the following logistic model: 
 
                                                          
9 I use the Compustat method for measuring fiscal year by assigning the prior calendar year as the fiscal year for 
fiscal years ending on or before June 30th. I then assign the current calendar year as the fiscal year for fiscal years 
ending between July 1st and December 31st. 
10 I define clients with busy season year-ends as clients with fiscal year-ends from December 15th through January 
15th. I extend busy season through January 15th because a cluster of clients have fiscal years ending in early January. 
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MAT_MISSTit = β0 + β1NT_VARit + β2LSIZEit + β3MERGERit + β4LEVit + β5LBUSSEGit  
 + β6FOREIGNOPSit + β7SALESGROWTHit + β8SALEVOLit + β9CFOit  
 + β10CFOVOLit + β11LOSSit + β12ROAit + β13ALTZit + β14MTBit + β15BIGNit  
 + β16SHORT_TENUREit + β17SPECIALISTit + β18OFFICE_SIZEit  
 + β19INFLUENCEit + β20GCit + β21MATWEAKit + β22NO_404it  
 + IndustryFE + YearFE + εit  (1) 
 
where, for client i and year t: 
MAT_MISST = indicator variable set equal to one if the client subsequently 
restates the current year financial statements and announces that 
restatement on Form 8-K, and zero otherwise; 
 
NT_VAR = one of two measures for the proportion of late-filing clients in an 
office: 1) the percentage of busy season late-filing clients in the 
office (NT_PCT), and 2) the size-weighted percentage of busy 
season late-filing clients in the office, measured as the percentage 
of busy season audit fees associated with late filers in an office 
(NT_SIZE); 
 
LSIZE = natural log of one plus total assets in millions; 
 
MERGER = indicator variable set equal to one if the client reported merger 
and acquisition activity, and zero otherwise; 
 
LEV = total long-term debt divided by average total assets; 
 
LBUSSEG = natural log of the count of business segments; 
 
FOREIGNOPS = indicator variable set equal to one if the client reported any 
foreign operations activity during the fiscal year, and zero 
otherwise; 
 
SALESGROWTH = current year revenues less prior year revenues, divided by prior 
year revenues; 
 
SALEVOL = standard deviation of total revenue, divided by lagged total 
assets, for the current and prior two years; 
 
CFO = net cash flows from operations divided by total assets; 
 
CFOVOL = standard deviation of net cash flows from operations, divided by 
lagged total assets, for the current and prior two years; 
 
LOSS = indicator variable set equal to one if the client has a net loss 
before extraordinary items, and zero otherwise; 
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ROA = income before extraordinary items divided by average total 
assets; 
ALTZ = Altman (1983) Z-score calculated as: 0.717 * working capitalit / 
total assetsit + 0.847 * retained earningsit / total assetsit + 3.107 * 
earnings before interest and taxesit / total assetsit + 0.420 * book 
value of equityit / total liabilitiesit + 0.998 * salesit / total assetsit; 
MTB = market value of common shares outstanding at fiscal year-end 
divided by book value of total equity; 
 
BIGN = indicator variable set equal to one if the auditor is one of the Big 
4 audit firms, and zero otherwise; 
SHORT_TENURE = indicator variable set equal to one if the client has employed the 
same auditor for three consecutive years or less, and zero 
otherwise; 
 
SPECIALIST = indicator variable set equal to one if the client’s auditor audits 
more than 33 percent of the current year total revenue in the 
client’s industry (two-digit SIC) within a Metropolitan Statistical 
Area (MSA), and zero otherwise; 
OFFICE_SIZE = natural log of total audit fees received by the office during the 
fiscal year; 
 
INFLUENCE = client audit fees divided by total audit fees received by the office; 
 
GC = indicator variable set equal to one if the client receives a going 
concern audit opinion, and zero otherwise; 
 
MATWEAK = indicator variable set equal to one if the client received a material 
weakness on the originally issued audit opinion, and zero 
otherwise; 
 
NO_404 = indicator variable set equal to one if the client does not receive 
an external audit opinion for internal controls over financial 
reporting in accordance with Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, and zero otherwise; 
 
IndustryFE = indicator variables for each two-digit SIC; 
 
YearFE = indicator variables for each fiscal year; and 
 




I test my second hypothesis by estimating the following ordinary least squares (OLS) 
model: 
LNAFit = γ0 + γ1NT_VARit + γ2LSIZEit + γ3MERGERit + γ4LEVit  
+ γ5LBUSSEGit + γ6FOREIGNOPSit + γ7SALESGROWTHit + γ8SALEVOLit  
+ γ9CFOit + γ10CFOVOLit + γ11LOSSit + γ12ROAit + γ13ALTZit + γ14MTBit  
+ γ15BIGNit + γ16SHORT_TENUREit + γ17SPECIALISTit + γ18OFFICE_SIZEit  
+ γ19INFLUENCEit + γ20GCit + γ21MATWEAKit + γ22NO_404it  
+ MSAFE + IndustryFE + YearFE + µit  (2) 
 
where control variables and subscripts i and t take the same meanings as in Equation (1), except I 
introduce the following variables: 
LNAF   = natural log of one plus audit fees; 
MSAFE = indicator variables for each MSA; and 
 
µ   = error term. 
Variables of Interest 
Following Wang et al. (2013), Bartov and Konchitchki (2017), and Khalil et al. (2017), I 
use Form 12b-25 to identify late-filing clients and to create my variables of interest. Specifically, 
I construct two proxies for an office-level resource allocation shock stemming from late-filing 
clients. First, I create a continuous variable equal to the percentage of an office’s busy season 
clients that file late (NT_PCT). Second, to capture the size of the late filers, I create a continuous 
variable equal to the percentage of an office’s busy season audit fees associated with the late 
filers (NT_SIZE). I define the audit office at the MSA level. β1 and γ1 are my coefficients of 
interest. If late-filing clients generate unexpected resource allocation shocks for the audit office, 
then I expect β1 to be positive and significant suggesting that timely-filing clients have lower 
audit quality when a late filer is in the audit office. I expect γ1 to be negative and significant, 
strengthening the inference that resources are allocated from timely filers to late filers. 
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In Equations (1) and (2), I include variables to control for client characteristics (e.g., size, 
complexity, financial performance) and auditor characteristics that can affect audit quality and 
auditor effort. I control for client size by including a variable for the natural log of total assets 
(LSIZE). I control for client complexity by including variables for the presence of merger or 
acquisition activity (MERGER), the presence of foreign operations (FOREIGNOPS), the number 
of business segments (LNBUSSEG), leverage (LEV), the volatility of cash flow from operations 
(CFOVOL), the volatility of total revenue (SALEVOL), and the receipt of a material weakness on 
the original opinion for internal controls over financial reporting (MATWEAK). I control for 
client financial performance by including cash flows from operations (CFO), return on assets 
(ROA), the receipt of a going concern opinion (GC), the market-to-book ratio (MTB), sales 
growth (SALESGROWTH), an indicator variable for a net loss (LOSS), and the Altman (1983) Z-
score (ALTZ). To control for auditor characteristics, I include variables for auditor industry 
specialization (SPECIALIST), auditor tenure (SHORT_TENURE), auditor size (BIGN), and audit-
office size (OFFICE_SIZE). I control for other potential issues that might affect the auditor-
client relationship by controlling for client influence (INFLUENCE) and whether the client 
received an external audit of internal controls over financial reporting in accordance with section 
404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (NO_404). To control for time-invariant industry-
level factors, I include industry fixed effects based on two-digit SIC codes (IndustryFE). To 
control for variation in audit quality and auditor effort over time that is not attributable to my 
variable of interest, I include year fixed effects (YearFE). In Equation (2), I include MSA fixed 
effects to control for the time-invariant pricing differences among MSAs (MSAFE). Except for 
my variables of interest, I winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to 
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reduce the effect of outliers. I do not winsorize my variables of interest because they range from 
zero to one. Finally, I cluster standard errors by client in all analyses (Petersen, 2009). 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
I provide descriptive statistics for timely-filing clients in Table 2 Panel A and 
comparative statistics for late-filing and timely-filing clients in Table 2 Panel B. Before I 
eliminate late filers from my sample, about 6.5 percent of busy season observations file late.11 
Approximately 46.0 percent of my observations (timely filers) have at least one late filer in their 
audit office.12 In Panel A, about 4.8 percent of clients in an office file late (NT_PCT) and those 
clients, on average, make up about 5.0 percent of the audit fees for that office (NT_SIZE). 
Approximately 1.9 percent of observations in the sample have a misstatement revealed in an 8-K 
(MAT_MISST). Compared to timely filers, in Panel B, late filers have a significantly higher 
amount of subsequently revealed material misstatements (4.7 percent versus 1.9 percent), a lower 
return on assets (-18.9 percent versus -3.9 percent), are more likely to receive a going concern 
audit opinion (28.4 percent versus 3.7 percent), and are more likely to have a material weakness 
(25.4 percent versus 2.1 percent). This provides univariate support for the idea that late filings 
would lead audit offices to allocate more resources to late filers. 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
Table 3 provides Pearson’s correlation coefficients for the main variables used in testing 
my hypotheses. Coefficients in bold are significant at the 10 percent level. With respect to my 
                                                          
11 Using data from Table 1, 6.5 percent is approximately equal to 1,058 / 16,305. The denominator is equal to the 
sum of the final sample of 14,107 observations, the 1,058 late-filing observations, and the 1,140 observations 
omitted due to no variation in the material misstatement analyses. 
12 Of the 14,107 observations, 6,489 have a late filer in their office. 
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variables of interest, NT_PCT and NT_SIZE are both positively and significantly correlated with 
MAT_MISST. Their most extreme correlations are with each other, followed by a negative 
correlation with BIGN and LNAF. This suggests that timely filers with late filers in the office are 
less likely have a large auditor and have lower audit fees. 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
Tests of Hypotheses 
Tests of Hypothesis 1 
Table 4 presents results for the estimations of Equation (1). The dependent variable in 
both regressions is MAT_MISST. The variable of interest is NT_PCT in Column (2) and 
NT_SIZE in Column (3). The area under the ROC curve is approximately 0.72 in both 
regressions, suggesting that the models provide an acceptable level of discrimination (Hosmer, 
Lemeshow, and Sturdivant, 2013). Consistent with my hypothesis, the coefficients on NT_PCT 
and NT_SIZE are both positive and significant (p < 0.05 and p < 0.01 respectively), suggesting 
that among timely-filing clients, the likelihood of a material misstatement increases with the 
proportion of clients in the office that file late. To facilitate interpreting the economic importance 
of this association, I use the average marginal effect of the variables of interest (untabulated). 
The average marginal effect is 0.024 for NT_PCT and is 0.023 for NT_SIZE. This suggests that a 
one standard deviation increase in NT_PCT (i.e., going from zero percent to 9.10 percent late-
filing clients) results in an approximately 11.50 percent increase in the unconditional probability 
of having a material misstatement (0.091 X 0.024 = 0.002814; 0.002814/0.019 ≈ 11.50 percent, 
where 0.019 is the sample rate of material misstatements). A one standard deviation increase in 
NT_SIZE (i.e., going from zero percent to 10.70 percent size-adjusted late-filing clients) results 
20 
 
in an approximately 12.95 percent increase in the unconditional probability of having a material 
misstatement (0.107 X 0.023 = 0.002461; 0.002461/0.019 ≈ 12.95 percent). 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
With respect to the control variables, in both Columns (2) and (3), I find positive and 
significant associations with leverage (LEV), the volatility of cash from operations (CFOVOL), 
and the receipt of a material weakness in internal controls over financial reporting (MATWEAK). 
I find negative and significant associations with the log of total assets (LSIZE), sales growth 
(SALESGROWTH), the receipt of a going concern opinion (GC), and when a client does not 
receive a SOX 404(b) audit over internal controls (NO_404). These coefficients are consistent 
with prior literature (Bills et al., 2016; Myllymaki, 2013). 
Tests of Hypothesis 2 
Results in Table 4 suggest a resource allocation shock stemming from late-filing clients is 
negatively associated with audit quality for the other timely-filing clients in an audit office. I 
posit that this is due to auditors allocating resources from timely-filing clients to late-filing 
clients. To strengthen this inference, I examine how audit effort (resource allocation) is 
associated with late-filing clients. I use audit fees as a proxy for audit effort (Lobo and Zhao, 
2013), which is an important input into the audit process (DeFond and Zhang, 2014), and 
examine how the percentage of late-filing clients is associated with audit effort. 
Table 5 presents results for estimations of Equation (2). In Columns (2) and (3), I find 
that the coefficients on NT_PCT and NT_SIZE are negative and significant (p < 0.10 and p < 
0.05 respectively). This suggests that audit fees are lower for timely filers as the percentage of 
late filers in that office increases and is consistent with fewer resources being allocated to timely-
filing clients as the percentage of late filers increases. 
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While Columns (2) and (3) show results for timely-filing clients, they do not offer 
insights on resources allocated to late-filing clients. To examine whether auditors allocate more 
resources to late-filing clients, I re-estimate Equation (2) but include observations for late filers 
and an indicator variable set equal to one if a client files Form 12b-25 for annual financial 
statements, and zero otherwise (NON_TIMELY). In Columns (4) and (5), the coefficients on 
NT_PCT and NT_SIZE are negative and significant while the coefficient on NON_TIMELY is 
positive and significant (all p < 0.01). This suggests that audit fees are lower for timely-filing 
clients as the percentage of late-filing clients increases and that audit fees are higher for late-
filing clients. This is consistent with auditors allocating resources from timely-filing clients to 
late-filing clients. 
In Column (6), I omit my proxies for the percentage of late-filing clients in the audit 
office and include only NON_TIMELY as the variable of interest. The coefficient on 
NON_TIMELY remains positive and significant (p < 0.01), supporting the idea that timely filers 
receive fewer resources because those resources are allocated to late filers. 
The results in Table 5 are also economically meaningful. For example, in Column (4), a 
client with the mean percentage of late-filing clients in the office would pay 1.07 percent less in 
fees than a client in an office with no late filers. In contrast, results in Column (4) suggest that 
late filing clients pay 11.60 percent more in audit fees than timely-filing clients in offices with no 
late filing clients. The economic impact for late-filers is similar to that reported in Wang et al. 
(2013) which finds that fees increase by approximately 11.40 percent for accelerated late-filers. 
These results, in conjunction with results from my tests of my first hypothesis, are consistent 
with a resource allocation shock stemming from late-filing clients and are consistent with 
auditors allocating resources from timely-filing clients to late-filing clients. 
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(Insert Table 5 here) 
With respect to the control variables, consistent with prior literature (Hay, Knechel, and 
Wong, 2006), variables positively associated with audit risk and auditor effort are positive and 
significant (LSIZE, MERGER, LBUSSEG, FOREIGNOPS, SALEVOL, LOSS, MTB, 
INFLUENCE, GC, and MATWEAK), variables negatively associated with audit risk and auditor 
effort are negative and significant (SALESGROWTH, ROA, ALTZ, and NO_404), while variables 
associated with higher auditor quality are positive and significant (OFFICE_SIZE).  
Interestingly, I find a negative and significant coefficient on BIGN. This is similar to 
findings in Choi, Kim, Kim, and Zang (2010) who also include a proxy for office size, measured 
using audit fees, in the same audit fee regression as a BIGN variable. When I exclude 
OFFICE_SIZE from my regressions (untabulated), the coefficient on BIGN is positive and 
significant in all audit fee regressions and my main results remain unchanged, except in the 
regression where NON_TIMELY is the only variable of interest. In that regression, the coefficient 
is insignificant (p = 0.125, one-tailed). I retain OFFICE_SIZE in my tests for my second 
hypothesis because OFFICE_SIZE proxies for both audit quality and auditor capacity and is 
correlated with my variables of interest. OFFICE_SIZE is positively correlated with the 
percentage of late filers (i.e., in Table 3, correlations between OFFICE_SIZE and both NT_PCT 
and NT_SIZE are negative and significant), the likelihood of a late filing (i.e., correlations 
between OFFICE_SIZE and NON_TIMELY are negative and significant (untabulated)), and the 
amount of fees charged (i.e., in Table 3, correlations between OFFICE_SIZE and LNAF are 




V. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
The results in Table 4 suggest a resource allocation shock stemming from late-filing 
clients is negatively associated with audit quality for the other timely-filing clients in an audit 
office. These results suggest that auditors allocate resources from timely-filing clients to late-
filing clients. In the remainder of this section, I report the results of several additional tests 
designed to strengthen my inference that the results are attributable to office-level resource 
allocation shocks stemming from the auditor responding to client pressure to complete the audit. 
I examine whether the relation between the percentage of late filers and timely filers’ audit 
quality is mitigated by office size, whether the relation is more pronounced among clients in the 
same industry as the late filer, and whether the relation is more pronounced when resources are 
more limited (i.e., fourth calendar quarter). Finally, I examine whether the auditor responds to 
clients that miss an expected filing date but still file on time. 
The Mitigating Effect of Large Audit Offices 
If the relation documented in Table 4 is attributable to an office-level resource allocation 
shock, then I would expect the association to be less pronounced among larger offices. Even 
though larger offices must still allocate resources when a shock occurs, offices with more 
resources should be in a better position to do so, suggesting that larger offices mitigate the effect 
of a resource allocation shock. 
To test this prediction, I interact my primary variables of interest, NT_PCT and NT_SIZE, 
with proxies for audit office size. My first audit office size proxy is the count of clients at the 
audit office (CLIENT_COUNT). The second is the log of total fees paid to the audit office for the 
fiscal year (OFFICE_SIZE). The results are presented in Table 6. For both proxies, I find that the 
coefficient on the interaction is significantly negative (p < 0. 10 for client count specifications 
24 
 
and p < 0.05 for audit fee specifications). Consistent with my expectation, the results suggest that 
the magnitude of the relation between audit quality for timely filers and the percentage of late 
filers in the office is lower as office size increases. 
 (Insert Table 6 here) 
Timely-Filing Clients that Share an Industry with Late-Filing Clients 
Prior research shows that auditors benefit from industry-level expertise (Ferguson, 
Francis, and Stokes, 2001; Dunn and Mayhew, 2004; Francis, Reichelt, and Wang, 2005; 
Reichelt and Wang, 2010). One possible benefit of having numerous clients within the same 
industry is having the depth of personnel with industry-relevant expertise, which might allow 
auditors to better respond to industry-specific issues. Thus, when faced with a late-filing client, I 
expect that audit offices will prefer to first secure resources with relevant experience and 
knowledge (i.e., personnel from the same industry). This, in turn, suggests that the effects of 
resource allocation shocks stemming from late filers might be more pronounced among clients 
from the same industry as the late-filing clients. 
To examine whether same-industry clients suffer more from resource allocation shocks 
than do clients in different industries, I modify Equation (1) by allowing the variables of interest 
to capture whether the timely-filing clients share an industry with the late-filing clients. I 
therefore create a variable for the percentage of busy season clients that are late filers that share a 
two-digit SIC code with the timely-filing client (PCT_SAMEIND) and another variable for the 
percentage of busy season clients that are late filers that do not share a two-digit SIC code with 
the timely-filing client (PCT_DIFFIND). I create similar variables for the size-weighted 
percentage of the late-filing clients (SIZE_DIFFIND, SIZE_SAMEIND). 
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Table 7 presents the results. The coefficients on the different-industry variables 
(PCT_DIFFIND and SIZE_DIFFIND) are positive and significant (p < 0.10 and p < 0.05 
respectively). The coefficients on the same-industry variables (PCT_SAMEIND and 
SIZE_SAMEIND) are also positive and significant (p < 0.10 and p < 0.01 respectively). Although 
the magnitude of the effect appears larger when the late filers are in the same industry, Chi-
square tests reveal that the coefficients are not statistically different. This suggests that late filing 
affects audit quality for timely-filing clients regardless of the late-filing clients’ industries. 
(Insert Table 7 here) 
Resource Allocation Shocks Outside of Busy Season 
If the relation documented in Table 4 is attributable to an office-level resource allocation 
shock, then I would expect the association to be more pronounced during periods when 
additional resources are limited and less pronounced during periods when additional resources 
are more readily available. As shown in Table 8, Panel A, the distribution of fiscal-year ends 
suggests that resource availability is lowest during the fourth quarter because it contains the 
highest concentration of fiscal-year ends (14,625 observations ) and that resource availability is 
highest during the first three quarters because they contain the lowest concentration of fiscal-year 
ends (with 952, 1,225, and 799 observations, respectively). Given the distribution of fiscal-year 
ends, I expect my main results to be more pronounced during the busiest time of the year (fourth 
quarter) and less pronounced during the other three quarters. 
To determine whether my association of interest exists during less-busy times, I perform 
analyses for each calendar quarter separately. I reconstruct my variables of interest for late filers 
for each calendar quarter and use a sample of timely-filing clients from those quarters. For 
example, I use Quarter 2 late filers when constructing my variable of interest and the sample 
26 
 
only includes Quarter 2 timely filers. I then estimate regressions for each calendar quarter. Table 
8 presents results for these analyses.  
(Insert Table 8 here) 
For the quarterly analyses documented in Table 8, Panels A and B, I find that timely 
filers have a significantly higher likelihood of a material misstatement for both 
NT_PCT_QUARTER and NT_SIZE_QUARTER in the second and fourth quarters but do not have 
a significantly different likelihood in the first and third quarters. I do not find statistically 
significant differences in the coefficients across quarters.13 Although the second calendar quarter 
is the second busiest quarter in terms of fiscal year-ends, the concentration in fiscal year-ends is 
similar to that in the first and third quarters. Collectively, the results in Table 8 provide weak 
evidence that resource allocation shocks are more pronounced during periods when additional 
resources are limited.14 
Resource Allocation Shocks Stemming from Missed Expected Filing Deadlines 
Prior research finds that unexpected filings lead to negative abnormal returns (Chambers 
and Penman, 1984) which the client would also want to avoid.15 If the client pressures the auditor 
to complete the audit in a timely manner out of a desire to avoid negative consequences, then I 
expect that a client that simply files later than expected, although still on time, might also 
pressure the auditor to invest additional resources to perform the audit. The auditor would then 
respond to this pressure, allocating resources to the filing-later-than-expected clients resulting in 
                                                          
13 To determine the statistical significance of the difference in coefficients between quarters, I estimate seemingly 
unrelated regressions and perform chi-square tests. 
14 I do not perform monthly analyses because the monthly sample sizes for the three busiest months after December 
are much smaller than those in the quarterly and busy season analyses. Moreover, the material misstatement rate is 
lower (e.g., March has a material misstatement rate of 0.9%, June has 1.5%, and September has 0.6%), resulting in 
significant sample attrition attributable to perfect multicollinearity.  
15 Chambers and Penman (1984) specifically examine earnings announcements, but the concept applies to other 
disclosures where market participants interpret late news as bad news. 
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lower audit quality for other clients that file when expected. That is, I expect that the effects of 
missed expected filing deadlines could be similar to the effects of missed SEC filing deadlines.  
To test this conjecture, I define an expected filing date as the prior year’s date the client 
files their audited annual financial statements.16 When a client files later than in the prior year, 
the client is said to have missed the expected filing date. I obtain the financial statement filing 
date using the file date from the Audit Analytics Audit Opinions database. I recalculate my 
variables of interest as the percentage and size-weighted percentage of clients that miss their 
expected filing date by more than five days (NT_PCT_UNEXPECTED and 
NT_SIZE_UNEXPECTED). I use five days as the cut-off for an expected filing date to allow a 
grace period for the effects of weekends and holidays. Then, I limit my sample to busy season 
observations in offices with clients that either missed their expected filing date or file when 
expected, excluding observations in offices with late filers. I exclude observations in offices with 
late filers because I do not want to confound the association between the re-measured variables 
of interest and the main proxies for the percentage of late-filing clients. 
Similar to my main analyses, Table 9 shows that both NT_PCT_UNEXPECTED and 
NT_SIZE_UNEXPECTED are negative and significantly associated with audit quality (p < 0.10 
and p < 0.05 respectively). These results, in conjunction with my main results in Table 4, suggest 
that auditors respond when clients miss their expected filing date, and not only the regulatory 
filing date. This is consistent with auditors allocating resources in response to clients’ pressure in 
order to avoid negative consequences. 
(Insert Table 9 here) 
 
                                                          
16 This approach is similar to that in Chambers and Penman (1984) who investigate late earnings announcements. 
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VI. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
 The prior analyses provide evidence that a resource allocation shock stemming from late-
filing clients is negatively associated with audit quality for the other timely-filing clients in an 
audit office and that auditors allocate resources from timely-filing clients to late-filing clients. In 
the following section, I report the results of several robustness tests designed to examine 
assumptions made in the research design. Specifically, I examine whether my results hold using 
alternative measures for audit quality, whether my results hold when limiting my sample to 
observations with late filers in the audit office, whether influential observations affect my results, 
and whether another measure for late filing might provide similar results. 
Alternative Measures for Audit Quality 
To ensure that my results are not driven by my choice of audit quality proxy, I use 
discretionary accruals and misstatements, regardless of materiality, as alternative proxies. 
Specifically, I use the absolute value of performance adjusted discretionary accruals (ABSDACC) 
following Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) as my first alternative measure.17 I then use 
misstatements, as revealed by subsequent restatements, regardless of materiality, as my second 
alternative measure. I re-estimate Equation (1) with discretionary accruals (using OLS) and 
misstatements (using logistic regressions) as my dependent variables. 
 Results in Table 10 show that the coefficients on NT_PCT and NT_SIZE in both 
discretionary accrual regressions are positive and significant (p < 0.10 for both) and are positive 
and significant in both misstatement logistic regressions (p < 0.05 and p < 0.01 respectively). 
                                                          
17 To calculate discretionary accruals, I estimate the following regression by industry-year: Total Accruals = α0 + 
α1(1/Assetsit-1) + α2ΔSalesit + α3PPEit + α4ROAit-1 + εit, with Sales and PPE scaled by lagged total assets. I require 
observations to have at least $5 million in total assets and industry-years to have at least 10 observations. The 
absolute value of the residual from this regression is ABSDACC. 
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This suggests that audit quality is lower for timely-filing clients as the percentage of late-filing 
clients in the office increases, consistent with results from my main tests. 
(Insert Table 10 here) 
Dropping Offices with no Late Filers 
Because more than half of my observations have zero late filers in the office, my results 
could be attributed to a dichotomous effect (i.e., going from zero to one or more late filers) or to 
a continuous effect (i.e., going from few to many late filers). If having late filers in an audit 
office results in a resource allocation shock, then going from few to many late filers should also 
adversely impact audit quality for timely filers. To determine whether my results hold as the 
amount of late filers increases from few to many, I re-estimate Equation (1) but omit 
observations where my variables of interest are equal to zero. 
The results are presented in Table 11. I find that the coefficients on NT_PCT and 
NT_SIZE remain positive and significant (p < 0.10 and p < 0.01 respectively), consistent with my 
main results. This suggests that audit quality is lower for timely filers as the amount of late filers 
increases from few to many. 
(Insert Table 11 here) 
Removing Influential Observations 
To ensure that my results are not driven by influential observations, I employ diagnostic 
techniques designed to identify influential observations. As suggested by Hosmer et al. (2013), I 
use leverage to identify outliers for logistic regressions. Leverage is calculated using the diagonal 
elements of the regression’s projection matrix adjusted for the number of observations that share 
the same covariate pattern (Pregibon 1981). I also use Pregibon’s dbeta to identify outliers 
(Pregibon 1981). Pregibon’s dbeta is a generalized measure of the change in the coefficient 
30 
 
vector that would be caused by deleting an observation and all other observations sharing the 
covariate pattern. Because it is a generalized measure, I can apply it to logistic regressions. 
Because of the diagnostic methods I use, I must visually identify influential observations 
by plotting leverage and Pregibon’s dbeta on the likelihood of a material misstatement generated 
from my logistic regressions. Hosmer et al. (2013) state that logistic regression diagnostics “have 
to rely primarily on visual assessment, [because] the distribution of the diagnostics under the 
hypothesis that the model fits is known only in certain limited settings” (p. 192). While dfbeta 
uses a formula to determine the cut-off of the diagnostic for influential observations, leverage 
and dbeta require a visual assessment for the cut-off. Figures 2 through 5 present output 
generated from Stata used to determine outliers. In those figures, I plot the leverage or 
Pregibon’s dbeta values on the likelihood of a material misstatement. I visually assess the 
leverage cut-off at 0.50 and dbeta cut-off at 0.10 for both NT_PCT and NT_SIZE specifications. I 
then estimate regressions without observations whose leverage or Pregibon’s dbeta are greater 
than the cut-offs, presented in Table 12. My results still hold after removing influential 
observations. 
(Insert Table 12 here) 
(Insert Figure 2 here) 
(Insert Figure 3 here) 
(Insert Figure 4 here) 
(Insert Figure 5 here) 
Including Late Filers that do not File Form 12b-25  
Following prior research (Wang et al., 2013; Bartov and Konchitchki, 2017; Khalil et al., 
2017), I use filed Form 12b-25s to identify late-filing clients. This choice might have affected 
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my results. Some clients that file late fail to file Form 12b-25. It is important to note, however, 
that these clients face additional consequences from the SEC and possibly also from market 
participants. I identify 66 observations where a client is at least five days late but does not file 
Form 12b-25.18 Although the 66 observations are not a large quantity, they have 429 other timely 
filers in their offices. I perform additional analyses including these observations that fail to file 
Form 12b-25 in recalculating my variables of interest (NT_PCT_ABSOLUTE and 
NT_SIZE_ABSOLUTE). I then exclude these non-Form 12b-25 late filers from my sample 
similar to Form 12b-25 late filers. In Table 13, I find results consistent with my main analyses. 
This suggests that my initial choice to identify late-filers with filed Form 12b-25s is not driving 
my results. 
(Insert Table 13 here) 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
I examine whether a resource allocation shock stemming from late-filing clients is 
associated with audit quality for the other timely-filing clients in an audit office and whether 
auditors allocate resources from timely-filing clients to late-filing clients. Because late-filing 
clients face significant negative consequences, they are likely to explicitly or implicitly pressure 
the auditor to invest additional resources to perform the audit. This, in turn, could result in lower 
audit quality for other clients in the office who serve as the source of additional resources. 
Although prior work has investigated client-specific implications of filing late, my study is the 
first to consider the potential implications late-filing clients have on other clients in the audit 
office. 
                                                          




I test my expectation with two hypotheses. I first examine the relation between audit 
quality and two variables that reflect office-level resource allocation shocks associated with late 
filings: 1) the percentage of late-filing clients in the office; and 2) the size-weighted percentage 
of late-filing clients in the office. I proxy for audit quality using subsequently restated financial 
statements where the restatement is announced using a Form 8-K (i.e., material misstatements). 
In tests of my first hypothesis, I find that the percentage of late-filing busy season clients and the 
size-weighted percentage of late-filing clients is associated with an increased likelihood in a 
material financial statement misstatement for the timely-filing clients in an audit office. I then 
examine the relation between my two proxies that reflect office-level resource allocation shocks 
and auditor effort (resources). I proxy for auditor effort (resources) using audit fees. In tests of 
my second hypothesis, I find that allocated resources are lower for timely-filing clients as the 
percentage and size-weighted percentage of late-filing clients increases. I find that late-filing 
clients pay higher audit fees, consistent with auditors allocating resources from timely-filing 
clients to late-filing clients.  
In additional tests, I first examine factors that mitigate resource allocation shocks. Using 
office-level client count and audit fees as proxies for office size, I find that the association 
between audit quality and both my proxies for the percentage of late filers is mitigated as office 
size increases. Next, I examine whether my primary results are more pronounced among clients 
sharing an industry with the late filer. I find evidence consistent with late filers affecting both 
clients in the same and in different industries. I then examine whether the association between 
the percentage of late filers and audit quality for timely filers is more pronounced when 
additional resources are limited, which is during the busiest time of the year (i.e., fourth calendar 
quarter). Using a sample of timely-filing clients with fiscal-year ends that fall within the 
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respective calendar quarters, I find that the results of my primary tests hold during the two 
busiest times of the year (second and fourth calendar quarters) but not during the less busy times 
of the year (first and third calendar quarters). However, I do not find statistically significant 
differences between any of the coefficients for each quarter. Finally, I examine whether missing 
expected filing dates similarly provides pressure for the auditor to complete the audit. I find 
evidence consistent with my main results. 
This study provides four contributions. First, I contribute to the literature on regulatory 
due dates and late filings. My study advances prior research by demonstrating that the impact of 
late filings extends to timely-filing clients that share an audit office with late-filing clients. 
Second, I contribute to the literature on the implications of audit office resource constraints. Prior 
literature examines implications of various constraints (e.g., busy season, filing deadline 
concentration, office growth, etc.). My study shows that a specific constraint, an office-level 
resource allocation shock, arises from late-filing clients. Third, I provide evidence of an office-
level signal about audit quality that is easily determinable and often revealed sooner than 
alternative signals (e.g., misstatements). Form 12b-25 filings might provide a more timely 
indication of office-level audit quality for investors, auditors, and regulators.  
Finally, my results highlight the importance of audit office resource allocation plans, 
resource slack, and late filings as relevant factors auditors should consider when making client 
acceptance and continuance decisions. In particular, my results suggest that the average audit 
office has insufficient resource slack to maintain audit quality when faced with late filers (i.e., 
they are unable to adequately respond to unexpected changes to resource allocation plans) and 
that this deficiency varies predictably with certain office characteristics that are influenced by 
client portfolio decisions. My results also underscore the importance of regulatory due dates and 
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should inform standard setters and regulators when considering costs associated with regulatory 
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Dependent Variables  Definition 
 
MAT_MISST  = indicator variable set equal to one if the client subsequently 
restates the current year financial statements and announces that 
restatement on Form 8-K, and zero otherwise. 
 
ABSDACC = absolute value of performance adjusted discretionary accruals 
following Kothari et al. (2005). 
 
MISST = indicator variable set equal to one if the client subsequently 
restates the current year financial statements, and zero otherwise. 
 
LNAF = natural log of one plus audit fees. 
 
Variables of Interest  Definition 
 
NT_PCT = percentage of busy season late-filing clients in the office. 
 
NT_SIZE = percentage of busy season audit fees associated with late filers in 
an office. 
 
NON_TIMELY = indicator variable set equal to one if the client files Form 12b-25, 
and zero otherwise. 
 
CLIENT_COUNT = count of clients in an audit office. 
 
PCT_SAMEIND = percentage of busy season clients in the office that are late-filing 
clients that share a two-digit SIC code with the timely-filing client. 
 
PCT_DIFFIND = percentage of busy season clients in the office that are late-filing 
clients that do not share a two-digit SIC code with the timely-filing 
client. 
 
SIZE_SAMEIND = percentage of busy season audit fees associated with late-filing 
clients in an office that are late filers that share a two-digit SIC 
code with the timely-filing client. 
 
SIZE_DIFFIND = percentage of busy season audit fees associated with late-filing 
clients in an office that are late filers that do not share a two-digit 
SIC code with the timely-filing client. 
 




NT_SIZE_QUARTER = percentage of calendar quarter audit fees associated with late-
filing clients in an office. 
 
NT_PCT_UNEXPECTED = percentage of busy season late-filing clients in the office that file 
annual financial statements later than in the prior fiscal year. 
 
NT_SIZE_UNEXPECTED = percentage of busy season audit fees associated with late-filing 
clients in an office that file annual financial statements later than in 
the prior fiscal year. 
 
NT_PCT_ABSOLUTE = percentage of busy season late-filing clients in the office that file 
Form 12b-25 or are at least five days late without filing Form 12b-
25. 
 
NT_SIZE_ABSOLUTE = percentage of busy season audit fees associated with late-filing 
clients in an office that file Form 12b-25 or are at least five days 
late without filing Form 12b-25. 
 
Control Variables  Definition 
 
LSIZE = natural log of one plus total assets in millions. 
 
MERGER = indicator variable set equal to one if the client reported merger 
and acquisition activity, and zero otherwise. 
 
LEV = total long-term debt divided by average total assets. 
 
LBUSSEG = natural log of the count of business segments. 
 
FOREIGNOPS = indicator variable set equal to one if the client reported any 
foreign operations activity during the fiscal year, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
SALESGROWTH = current year revenues less prior year revenues, divided by prior 
year revenues. 
 
SALEVOL = standard deviation of total revenue, divided by lagged total 
assets, for the current and prior two years. 
 
CFO = net cash flows from operations divided by total assets. 
 
CFOVOL = standard deviation of net cash flows from operations, divided by 
lagged total assets, for the current and prior two years. 
 
LOSS = indicator variable set equal to one if the client has a net loss 




ROA = income before extraordinary items divided by average total 
assets. 
 
ALTZ = Altman (1983) Z score calculated as: 0.717 * working capitalit / 
total assetsit + 0.847 * retained earningsit / total assetsit + 3.107 * 
earnings before interest and taxesit / total assetsit + 0.420 * book 
value of equityit / total liabilitiesit + 0.998 * salesit / total assetsit. 
 
MTB = market value of common shares outstanding at fiscal year-end 
divided by book value of total equity. 
 
BIGN = indicator variable set equal to one if the auditor is one of the Big 
4 audit firms, and zero otherwise. 
 
SHORT_TENURE = indicator variable set equal to one if the client has employed the 
same auditor for three consecutive years or less, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
SPECIALIST = indicator variable set equal to one if the client’s auditor audits 
more than 33 percent of the current year total revenue in the 
client’s industry (two-digit SIC) within an MSA, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
OFFICE_SIZE = natural log of total audit fees received by the office during the 
fiscal year. 
 
INFLUENCE = client audit fees divided by total audit fees received by the office. 
 
GC = indicator variable set equal to one if the client receives a going 
concern audit opinion, and zero otherwise. 
 
MATWEAK = indicator variable set equal to one if the client received a material 
weakness on the originally issued audit opinion, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
NO_404 = indicator variable set equal to one if the client does not receive 
an external audit opinion for internal controls over financial 
reporting in accordance with Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, and zero otherwise. 
 
MSAFE = indicator variables for each MSA. 
 
IndustryFE = indicator variables for each two-digit SIC. 
 
YearFE = indicator variables for each fiscal year. 
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TABLE 1: Sample Selection 
 
   
Intersection of Compustat and Audit Analytics from 2006 through 2013 71,369 
Less: Financial institutions with SIC code between 6000 and 6999 (17,825) 
Less: Observations not during busy season (20,268) 
Less: Observations without required variables (16,049) 
Less: Observations with less than $5 million in total assets (922) 
Less: Observations with late filings (1,058) 
Less: Observations with no variation in material misstatement analyses (1,140) 
 Observations used to test H1 14,107 
   
Less: Observations without audit fees (34) 





TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics 
All variables are as defined in Appendix A. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for timely filing sample 
 
Variable Name  N Mean St. Dev. 25% Median 75% 
        
MAT_MISST  14,107 0.019 0.137 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NT_PCT  14,107 0.048 0.091 0.000 0.000 0.056 
NT_SIZE  14,107 0.050 0.107 0.000 0.000 0.043 
LSIZE  14,107 6.311 2.125 4.750 6.238 7.828 
MERGER  14,107 0.377 0.485 0.000 0.000 1.000 
LEV  14,107 0.240 0.245 0.015 0.190 0.365 
LBUSSEG  14,107 0.603 0.720 0.000 0.000 1.386 
FOREIGNOPS  14,107 0.303 0.460 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SALESGROWTH  14,107 0.144 0.503 -0.039 0.069 0.203 
SALEVOL  14,107 0.207 0.290 0.050 0.113 0.241 
CFO  14,107 0.034 0.198 0.021 0.077 0.128 
CFOVOL  14,107 0.086 0.144 0.021 0.043 0.086 
LOSS  14,107 0.353 0.478 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ROA  14,107 -0.039 0.236 -0.052 0.029 0.073 
ALTZ  14,107 2.464 4.121 0.965 2.119 3.647 
MTB  14,107 2.847 4.917 1.135 1.940 3.399 
BIGN  14,107 0.735 0.441 0.000 1.000 1.000 
SHORT_TENURE  14,107 0.169 0.375 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SPECIALIST  14,107 0.524 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000 
OFFICE_SIZE  14,107 16.957 1.842 15.775 17.377 18.376 
INFLUENCE  14,107 0.118 0.197 0.014 0.042 0.120 
GC  14,107 0.037 0.189 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MATWEAK  14,107 0.021 0.144 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NO_404  14,107 0.179 0.384 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MISST  14,107 0.096 0.295 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ABSDACC  13,539 0.098 0.150 0.018 0.046 0.107 





Panel B: Descriptive statistics for late-filing clients, timely-filing clients 
Column (5) presents the differences in means between Columns (2) and (4) and Column (6) 
presents the associated t-statistic. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively (based on two-tailed tests). 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Late Filers Timely Filers   
Variable Name  N Mean N Mean Diff t-stat 
        
MAT_MISST  1,058 0.047 14,107 0.019 0.028*** (4.25) 
NT_PCT  1,058 0.324 14,107 0.048 0.276*** (31.09) 
NT_SIZE  1,058 0.351 14,107 0.050 0.301*** (31.10) 
LSIZE  1,058 4.771 14,107 6.311 -1.540*** (-25.73) 
MERGER  1,058 0.313 14,107 0.377 -0.064*** (-4.30) 
LEV  1,058 0.299 14,107 0.240 0.059*** (6.12) 
LBUSSEG  1,058 0.548 14,107 0.603 -0.055*** (-2.61) 
FOREIGNOPS  1,058 0.252 14,107 0.303 -0.051*** (-3.65) 
SALESGROWTH  1,058 0.216 14,107 0.144 0.072*** (3.04) 
SALEVOL  1,058 0.373 14,107 0.207 0.166*** (11.05) 
CFO  1,058 -0.052 14,107 0.034 -0.086*** (-11.94) 
CFOVOL  1,058 0.157 14,107 0.086 0.071*** (9.86) 
LOSS  1,058 0.657 14,107 0.353 0.304*** (20.07) 
ROA  1,058 -0.189 14,107 -0.039 -0.150*** (-14.18) 
ALTZ  1,058 0.838 14,107 2.464 -1.626*** (-11.01) 
MTB  1,058 2.242 14,107 2.847 -0.605*** (-3.37) 
BIGN  1,058 0.417 14,107 0.735 -0.318*** (-20.38) 
SHORT_TENURE  1,058 0.404 14,107 0.169 0.235*** (15.18) 
SPECIALIST  1,058 0.353 14,107 0.524 -0.171*** (-11.22) 
OFFICE_SIZE  1,058 15.753 14,107 16.957 -1.204*** (-17.34) 
INFLUENCE  1,058 0.178 14,107 0.118 0.060*** (7.81) 
GC  1,058 0.284 14,107 0.037 0.247*** (17.67) 
MATWEAK  1,058 0.254 14,107 0.021 0.233*** (17.33) 
NO_404  1,058 0.483 14,107 0.179 0.304*** (19.33) 
MISST  1,058 0.135 14,107 0.096 0.039*** (3.60) 
ABSDACC  1,012 0.168 13,539 0.098 0.070*** (10.18) 




TABLE 3: Correlations 
This table presents Pearson’s pairwise correlation coefficients. Bold indicates significance at the 10% level. All variables are as 
defined in Appendix A.  
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 
1. MAT_MISST 1.0000             
2. NT_PCT 0.0287 1.0000            
3. NT_SIZE 0.0295 0.8161 1.0000           
4. LSIZE -0.0232 -0.2241 -0.1918 1.0000          
5. MERGER -0.0100 -0.0679 -0.0492 0.2949 1.0000         
6. LEV 0.0452 -0.0246 -0.0496 0.2648 0.0512 1.0000        
7. LBUSSEG -0.0146 -0.0675 -0.0597 0.3285 0.2042 0.0496 1.0000       
8. FOREIGNOPS -0.0221 -0.0540 -0.0462 0.1380 0.1143 -0.0939 0.0688 1.0000      
9. SALESGROWTH -0.0018 0.0469 0.0297 -0.0675 0.0128 0.0240 -0.0718 -0.0184 1.0000     
10. SALEVOL 0.0323 0.0959 0.0618 -0.2435 -0.0317 -0.0657 -0.0659 -0.0439 0.1247 1.0000    
11. CFO -0.0018 -0.0886 -0.0851 0.4038 0.2076 -0.0130 0.1699 0.0900 -0.0639 -0.0268 1.0000   
12. CFOVOL 0.0457 0.1279 0.0992 -0.3717 -0.1814 -0.0716 -0.2010 -0.0850 0.2504 0.3886 -0.4123 1.0000  
13. LOSS 0.0022 0.0804 0.0664 -0.3999 -0.2122 0.0322 -0.2121 -0.0621 -0.0012 0.0881 -0.5116 0.2657 1.0000 
14. ROA -0.0107 -0.0882 -0.0723 0.4191 0.2098 -0.0481 0.1942 0.1043 -0.0478 -0.0463 0.8130 -0.4248 -0.6582 
15. ALTZ -0.0079 -0.0170 0.0030 0.0593 0.0731 -0.3602 -0.0099 0.0600 0.0538 0.0675 0.4185 -0.0789 -0.2953 
16. MTB 0.0023 0.0045 0.0131 -0.0335 -0.0134 -0.0895 -0.0727 -0.0096 0.0982 0.0242 -0.0206 0.1030 -0.0003 
17. BIGN -0.0220 -0.3150 -0.2159 0.5563 0.1794 0.1038 0.1312 0.1064 -0.0336 -0.1836 0.1500 -0.2143 -0.1762 
18. SHRT_TENURE  0.0158 0.1613 0.1222 -0.2301 -0.0727 -0.0280 -0.0590 -0.0328 0.0581 0.1404 -0.0816 0.1364 0.1036 
19. SPECIALIST -0.0166 -0.1736 -0.1227 0.3435 0.1112 0.0850 0.1153 0.0030 -0.0245 -0.0907 0.0985 -0.1287 -0.1308 
20. OFFICE_SIZE -0.0157 -0.2115 -0.1148 0.4984 0.1682 0.0633 0.1055 0.1563 -0.0340 -0.1733 0.1207 -0.1819 -0.1235 
21. INFLUENCE -0.0062 -0.0225 -0.0701 -0.0067 -0.0095 0.0527 0.0545 -0.0270 -0.0046 0.0497 0.0106 0.0098 -0.0191 
22. GC -0.0054 0.1030 0.0616 -0.2378 -0.1167 0.0967 -0.1017 -0.0566 -0.0007 0.0518 -0.3633 0.2100 0.2308 
23. MATWEAK 0.0371 0.0079 0.0112 -0.0192 0.0126 0.0019 -0.0057 0.0250 -0.0122 0.0247 -0.0125 0.0036 0.0417 
24. NO_404 0.0010 0.2170 0.1545 -0.5827 -0.2132 -0.0723 -0.1441 -0.1183 -0.0172 0.1730 -0.2226 0.2140 0.2403 
25. MISST 0.4272 -0.0040 0.0008 0.0590 0.0524 0.0603 0.0510 0.0153 0.0016 0.0068 0.0321 -0.0041 -0.0167 
26. ABSDACC 0.0096 0.0809 0.0659 -0.2320 -0.0944 0.0058 -0.1142 -0.0208 0.1410 0.1254 -0.2697 0.3009 0.1718 








TABLE 3: Correlations (Cont.) 
 
Variable 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 29. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 
14. ROA 1.0000             
15. ALTZ 0.4416 1.0000            
16. MTB -0.0132 0.1835 1.0000           
17. BIGN 0.1616 0.0344 0.0241 1.0000          
18. SHRT_TENURE -0.0897 -0.0327 -0.0146 -0.3233 1.0000         
19. SPECIALIST 0.1164 0.0136 -0.0015 0.3796 -0.1400 1.0000        
20. OFFICE_SIZE 0.1335 0.0377 0.0346 0.7314 -0.2435 0.1725 1.0000       
21. INFLUENCE 0.0145 -0.0279 -0.0338 -0.3083 0.0755 0.0615 -0.6235 1.0000      
22. GC -0.3901 -0.3218 -0.0470 -0.1460 0.0746 -0.0704 -0.1328 0.0469 1.0000     
23. MATWEAK -0.0169 -0.0130 0.0033 -0.0209 0.0463 -0.0155 -0.0125 0.0303 0.0129 1.0000    
24. NO_404 -0.2376 -0.1742 -0.0781 -0.5321 0.2201 -0.2262 -0.4783 0.1324 0.2382 -0.0688 1.0000   
25. MISST 0.0241 -0.0042 -0.0002 0.0381 -0.0174 0.0088 0.0297 0.0022 -0.0296 0.0554 -0.0555 1.0000  
26. ABSDACC -0.2640 -0.0741 0.0834 -0.1346 0.0618 -0.1013 -0.0920 0.0037 0.1874 0.0129 0.1376 0.0028 1.0000 








TABLE 4: Non-Timely Filings and Audit Quality for Other Timely-Filing Clients 
Column (1) indicates the predicted sign of the coefficients of interest. The dependent variable in 
Columns (2) and (3) is MAT_MISST. ***, **, and * indicate one (two) tailed significance when 
a prediction is (is not) made at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. All variables are as 
defined in Appendix A. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Name (+/-) MAT_MISST MAT_MISST 
    
NT_PCT + 1.346**  
  (1.875)  
NT_SIZE +  1.252*** 
   (2.466) 
LSIZE  -0.156* -0.150* 
  (-1.951) (-1.890) 
MERGER  -0.016 -0.019 
  (-0.095) (-0.110) 
LEV  1.393*** 1.401*** 
  (4.746) (4.779) 
LBUSSEG  -0.013 -0.015 
  (-0.083) (-0.096) 
FOREIGNOPS  -0.170 -0.169 
  (-0.716) (-0.710) 
SALESGROWTH  -0.243* -0.235* 
  (-1.885) (-1.837) 
SALEVOL  0.159 0.163 
  (0.667) (0.685) 
CFO  0.794 0.822 
  (1.512) (1.566) 
CFOVOL  1.540*** 1.545*** 
  (3.056) (3.066) 
LOSS  -0.298 -0.298 
  (-1.411) (-1.412) 
ROA  -0.487 -0.503 
  (-0.957) (-0.989) 
ALTZ  0.007 0.007 
  (0.400) (0.386) 
MTB  0.002 0.001 
  (0.125) (0.103) 
BIGN  -0.126 -0.136 
  (-0.367) (-0.395) 
SHORT_TENURE  0.033 0.033 
  (0.189) (0.190) 
47 
 
TABLE 4: Non-Timely Filings and Audit Quality for Other Timely-Filing Clients 
(Cont.) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Name (+/-) MAT_MISST MAT_MISST 
    
SPECIALIST  -0.157 -0.166 
  (-0.740) (-0.783) 
OFFICE_SIZE  0.000 -0.006 
  (0.003) (-0.045) 
INFLUENCE  -0.467 -0.463 
  (-0.621) (-0.623) 
GC  -0.832** -0.803** 
  (-2.115) (-2.044) 
MATWEAK  1.045*** 1.039*** 
  (3.298) (3.283) 
NO_404  -0.485* -0.484* 
  (-1.711) (-1.701) 
Constant  -3.307 -3.268 
  (-1.360) (-1.359) 
    
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
    
Observations  14,107 14,107 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0691 0.0696 
Area Under the ROC Curve 0.7161 0.7166 
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TABLE 5: Auditor Effort and Filing Timeliness 
Column (1) indicates the predicted sign of the coefficients of interest. The dependent variable is 
LNAF. ***, **, and * indicate one (two) tailed significance when a prediction is (is not) made at 
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Name (+/-) LNAF LNAF LNAF LNAF LNAF 
       
NT_PCT - -0.082*  -0.223***   
  (-1.394)  (-4.774)   
NT_SIZE -  -0.080**  -0.135***  
   (-1.863)  (-3.659)  
NON_TIMELY +   0.116*** 0.100*** 0.066*** 
    (5.474) (4.878) (3.282) 
LSIZE  0.424*** 0.423*** 0.420*** 0.419*** 0.419*** 
  (60.805) (60.769) (63.437) (63.386) (63.313) 
MERGER  0.070*** 0.070*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 
  (5.420) (5.427) (5.463) (5.480) (5.482) 
LEV  -0.122*** -0.122*** -0.116*** -0.117*** -0.118*** 
  (-3.452) (-3.462) (-3.584) (-3.634) (-3.647) 
LBUSSEG  0.075*** 0.075*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 
  (6.489) (6.495) (6.474) (6.475) (6.484) 
FOREIGNOPS  0.185*** 0.184*** 0.186*** 0.186*** 0.186*** 
  (10.850) (10.837) (11.481) (11.451) (11.463) 
SALESGROWTH  -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.038*** 
  (-4.746) (-4.768) (-4.808) (-4.829) (-4.798) 
SALEVOL  0.155*** 0.155*** 0.157*** 0.157*** 0.157*** 
  (7.514) (7.508) (8.151) (8.130) (8.105) 
CFO  0.028 0.027 0.025 0.024 0.027 
  (0.644) (0.627) (0.630) (0.618) (0.672) 
CFOVOL  -0.204*** -0.204*** -0.202*** -0.204*** -0.206*** 
  (-4.976) (-4.972) (-5.028) (-5.054) (-5.094) 
LOSS  0.054*** 0.054*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.047*** 
  (3.722) (3.716) (3.526) (3.507) (3.466) 
ROA  -0.182*** -0.181*** -0.184*** -0.184*** -0.188*** 
  (-5.181) (-5.168) (-5.575) (-5.581) (-5.684) 
ALTZ  -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** 
  (-8.724) (-8.726) (-9.414) (-9.413) (-9.385) 
MTB  0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
  (2.897) (2.898) (3.044) (3.006) (2.970) 
BIGN  -0.116*** -0.116*** -0.124*** -0.128*** -0.128*** 
  (-3.310) (-3.328) (-3.888) (-3.988) (-4.003) 
SHORT_TENURE  -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 -0.018 -0.019 
  (-1.184) (-1.179) (-1.357) (-1.364) (-1.453) 
SPECIALIST  0.019 0.019 0.016 0.016 0.014 
  (1.056) (1.071) (0.955) (0.947) (0.864) 
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TABLE 5: Auditor Effort and Filing Timeliness (Cont.) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Name (+/-) LNAF LNAF LNAF LNAF LNAF 
       
OFFICE_SIZE  0.261*** 0.262*** 0.270*** 0.274*** 0.278*** 
  (22.371) (22.534) (25.451) (25.941) (26.210) 
INFLUENCE  1.294*** 1.294*** 1.303*** 1.310*** 1.313*** 
  (19.750) (19.794) (21.855) (21.967) (22.071) 
GC  0.113*** 0.112*** 0.087*** 0.083*** 0.081*** 
  (4.093) (4.068) (3.620) (3.463) (3.368) 
MATWEAK  0.180*** 0.180*** 0.227*** 0.231*** 0.236*** 
  (5.762) (5.758) (8.228) (8.313) (8.537) 
NO_404  -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.094*** -0.095*** -0.096*** 
  (-4.358) (-4.349) (-4.804) (-4.840) (-4.904) 
Constant  6.297*** 6.287*** 6.664*** 6.606*** 6.546*** 
  (27.935) (28.235) (22.718) (22.560) (22.314) 
       
MSA Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations  14,073 14,073 16,253 16,253 16,253 
Adjusted R-squared  0.892 0.892 0.890 0.890 0.890 
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TABLE 6: The Mitigating Effect of Large Audit Offices 
Column (1) indicates the predicted sign of the coefficients of interest. The dependent variable is 
MAT_MISST. ***, **, and * indicate one (two) tailed significance when a prediction is (is not) 
made at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. All variables are as defined in Appendix A.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable Name (+/-) MAT_MISST MAT_MISST MAT_MISST MAT_MISST 
      
NT_PCT ? 2.007**  10.568*  
  (2.281)  (1.951)  
NT_SIZE ?  1.916***  10.638** 
   (2.704)  (2.458) 
NT_PCT_X_CLIENT_COUNT - -0.078*    
  (-1.647)    
NT_SIZE_X_CLIENT_COUNT -  -0.047*   
   (-1.497)   
NT_PCT_X_OFFICE_SIZE -   -0.638**  
    (-1.706)  
NT_SIZE_X_OFFICE_SIZE -    -0.613** 
     (-2.180) 
CLIENT_COUNT  0.018** 0.017**   
  (2.358) (2.384)   
OFFICE_SIZE  -0.255 -0.258 0.047 0.056 
  (-1.538) (-1.591) (0.337) (0.394) 
      
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations  14,107 14,107 14,107 14,107 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0736 0.0744 0.0704 0.0721 




TABLE 7: Timely-Filing Clients that Share an Industry with Late-Filing Clients  
Column (1) indicates the predicted sign of the coefficients of interest. The dependent variable is 
MAT_MISST. ***, **, and * indicate one (two) tailed significance when a prediction is (is not) 
made at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. All variables are as defined in Appendix A.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Name (+/-) MAT_MISST MAT_MISST 
    
PCT_SAMEIND + 2.601*  
  (1.350)  
PCT_DIFFIND + 1.187*  
  (1.437)  
SIZE_SAMEIND +  2.709*** 
   (2.375) 
SIZE_DIFFIND +  1.008** 
   (1.668) 
    
Control Variables  Yes Yes 
Intercept  Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
    
Observations  14,107 14,107 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0693 0.0702 
Area Under the ROC Curve 0.7158 0.7160 
   
Test of equality (Chi-square)   
PCT SAMEIND = DIFFIND 1.414  
 (0.41)  
SIZE SAMEIND = DIFFIND  1.701 





TABLE 8: Resource Allocation Shocks Outside of Busy Season  
 
Panel A: NT_PCT logistic regressions by quarter 
Column (1) indicates the predicted sign of the coefficients of interest. The dependent variable is 
MAT_MISST. ***, **, and * indicate one (two) tailed significance when a prediction is (is not) 
made at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. All variables are as defined in Appendix A.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 MAT_MISST MAT_MISST MAT_MISST MAT_MISST 
Variable Name (+/-) Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
      
NT_PCT_QUARTER + -1.258 3.086** -1.621 1.288** 
  (-0.395) (1.771) (-0.533) (1.833) 
      
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations  952 1,225 799 14,625 
Pseudo R-squared 0.399 0.235 0.308 0.0753 
Area Under the ROC Curve 0.9266 0.8626 0.8896 0.7216 
     
Test of equality (Chi-square)     
PCT Q4 = Q1    2.546 
    (0.61) 
PCT Q4 = Q2    -1.798 
    (0.92) 
PCT Q4 = Q3    2.909 
    (0.87) 
PCT Q2 = Q1  4.344   
  (1.44)   
PCT Q2 = Q3  4.707   
  (1.81)   
PCT Q1 = Q3 0.363    




Panel B: NT_SIZE logistic regressions by quarter 
Column (1) indicates the predicted sign of the coefficients of interest. The dependent variable is 
MAT_MISST. ***, **, and * indicate one (two) tailed significance when a prediction is (is not) 
made at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. All variables are as defined in Appendix A.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 MAT_MISST MAT_MISST MAT_MISST MAT_MISST 
Variable Name (+/-) Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
      
NT_SIZE_QUARTER + 0.126 2.179* -1.040 1.193*** 
  (0.052) (1.628) (-0.497) (2.353) 
      
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations  952 1,225 799 14,625 
Pseudo R-squared 0.398 0.230 0.308 0.0757 
Area Under the ROC Curve 0.9267 0.8584 0.8890 0.7220 
     
Test of equality (Chi-square)     
SIZE Q4 = Q1    1.067 
    (0.18) 
SIZE Q4 = Q2    -0.986 
    (0.48) 
SIZE Q4 = Q3    2.233 
    (1.08) 
SIZE Q2 = Q1  2.053   
  (0.55)   
SIZE Q2 = Q3  3.219   
  (1.69)   
SIZE Q1 = Q3 1.166    





TABLE 9: Resource Allocation Shocks Stemming from Missed Expected Filing Deadlines 
Column (1) indicates the predicted sign of the coefficients of interest. The dependent variable is 
MAT_MISST. ***, **, and * indicate one (two) tailed significance when a prediction is (is not) 
made at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Name (+/-) MAT_MISST MAT_MISST 
    
NT_PCT_UNEXPECTED + 1.239*  
  (1.595)  
NT_SIZE_UNEXPECTED +  1.426** 
   (2.308) 
    
Control Variables  Yes Yes 
Intercept  Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
    
Observations  5,734 5,734 
Pseudo R-squared 0.117 0.120 




TABLE 10: Alternative Measures for Audit Quality  
Column (1) indicates the predicted sign of the coefficients of interest. The dependent variable in 
Columns (2) and (3) is ABSDACC and in Columns (4) and (5) is MISST. ***, **, and * indicate 
one (two) tailed significance when a prediction is (is not) made at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable Name (+/-) ABSDACC ABSDACC MISST MISST 
      
NT_PCT + 0.026*  0.960**  
  (1.684)  (2.165)  
NT_SIZE +  0.020*  0.906*** 
   (1.840)  (2.919) 
LSIZE  -0.004*** -0.004*** 0.002 0.005 
  (-4.757) (-4.675) (0.056) (0.124) 
MERGER  0.005** 0.005** 0.210** 0.209** 
  (2.137) (2.128) (2.525) (2.507) 
LEV  0.033*** 0.034*** 0.777*** 0.783*** 
  (4.302) (4.319) (4.117) (4.146) 
LBUSSEG  0.002 0.002 0.198*** 0.198*** 
  (1.569) (1.566) (2.831) (2.828) 
FOREIGNOPS  0.000 0.000 0.035 0.037 
  (0.160) (0.181) (0.348) (0.373) 
SALESGROWTH  0.013*** 0.013*** -0.010 -0.006 
  (3.535) (3.549) (-0.135) (-0.087) 
SALEVOL  0.032*** 0.032*** 0.101 0.104 
  (5.366) (5.388) (0.707) (0.727) 
CFO  0.001 0.002 0.507* 0.522* 
  (0.096) (0.105) (1.668) (1.712) 
CFOVOL  0.091*** 0.091*** 0.940*** 0.942*** 
  (5.118) (5.113) (3.192) (3.204) 
LOSS  -0.007** -0.007** 0.074 0.073 
  (-2.311) (-2.307) (0.697) (0.696) 
ROA  -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.215 -0.224 
  (-2.602) (-2.612) (-0.747) (-0.782) 
ALTZ  0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
  (1.466) (1.471) (-0.147) (-0.151) 
MTB  0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 
  (1.366) (1.374) (0.226) (0.220) 
BIGN  -0.005 -0.006 0.138 0.131 
  (-1.297) (-1.389) (0.795) (0.763) 
SHORT_TENURE  0.001 0.001 -0.029 -0.031 





TABLE 10: Alternative Audit Quality Measures (Cont.) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable Name (+/-) ABSDACC ABSDACC MISST MISST 
      
SPECIALIST  -0.003 -0.003 -0.100 -0.106 
  (-1.069) (-1.138) (-1.067) (-1.130) 
OFFICE_SIZE  -0.002* -0.003** 0.016 0.012 
  (-1.924) (-2.017) (0.294) (0.231) 
INFLUENCE  -0.004 -0.005 0.226 0.230 
  (-0.546) (-0.614) (0.666) (0.684) 
GC  0.066*** 0.066*** -0.524** -0.509** 
  (6.616) (6.643) (-2.383) (-2.310) 
MATWEAK  0.006 0.006 0.943*** 0.942*** 
  (0.849) (0.849) (5.580) (5.573) 
NO_404  0.007 0.007 -0.464*** -0.464*** 
  (1.537) (1.559) (-2.904) (-2.908) 
Constant  0.089*** 0.091*** -3.089*** -3.010*** 
  (4.138) (4.231) (-2.784) (-2.790) 
      
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations  14,465 14,465 14,107 14,107 
Adjusted/Pseudo R-squared 0.311 0.311 0.0440 0.0443 




TABLE 11: Dropping Offices with no Late Filers 
Column (1) indicates the predicted sign of the coefficients of interest. The dependent variable is 
MAT_MISST. ***, **, and * indicate one (two) tailed significance when a prediction is (is not) 
made at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Name (+/-) MAT_MISST MAT_MISST 
    
NT_PCT + 1.747*  
  (1.427)  
NT_SIZE +  1.385*** 
   (2.587) 
    
Control Variables  Yes Yes 
Intercept  Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
    
Observations  6,003 6,003 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0867 0.0882 




TABLE 12: Removing Influential Observations 
Column (1) indicates the predicted sign of the coefficients of interest. The dependent variable is 
MAT_MISST. ***, **, and * indicate one (two) tailed significance when a prediction is (is not) 
made at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable Name (+/-) dbeta dbeta Leverage Leverage 
      
NT_PCT + 1.224**  1.332**  
  (1.825)  (2.129)  
NT_SIZE +  1.199**  1.239*** 
   (2.278)  (2.511) 
      
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations  12,253 12,253 14,102 14,102 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0689 0.0696 0.0682 0.0688 




TABLE 13: Including Late-Filers that do not File Form 12b-25 
Column (1) indicates the predicted sign of the coefficients of interest. The dependent variable is 
MAT_MISST. ***, **, and * indicate one (two) tailed significance when a prediction is (is not) 
made at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Name (+/-) MAT_MISST MAT_MISST 
    
NT_PCT_ABSOLUTE + 1.189**  
  (1.655)  
NT_SIZE_ABSOLUTE +  1.238*** 
   (2.445) 
    
Control Variables  Yes Yes 
Intercept  Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
    
Observations  14,044 14,044 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0684 0.0693 






Figure 1: Non-Timely Filing Trend 
The line with the circle nodes presents the number of Compustat companies with gvkeys by year. 
The line with the square nodes presents the number of non-timely filings (i.e., Form 12b-25) by 
year. The line with the triangle nodes presents the percentage of non-timely filings of Compustat 






































































FIGURE 2: Pregibon’s dbeta Scatter Plot for NT_PCT 
The vertical axis presents Pregibon’s dbeta diagnostic values while the horizontal axis presents 
the probability of a material misstatement generated from Equation (1) using NT_PCT for the 








FIGURE 3: Pregibon’s dbeta Scatter Plot for NT_SIZE 
The vertical axis presents Pregibon’s dbeta diagnostic values while the horizontal axis presents 
the probability of a material misstatement generated from Equation (1) using NT_SIZE for the 







FIGURE 4: Leverage Scatter Plot for NT_PCT 
The vertical axis presents leverage diagnostic values while the horizontal axis presents the 
probability of a material misstatement generated from Equation (1) using NT_SIZE for the 









FIGURE 5: Leverage Scatter Plot for NT_SIZE 
The vertical axis presents leverage diagnostic values while the horizontal axis presents the 
probability of a material misstatement generated from Equation (1) using NT_SIZE for the 
variable of interest. The numbers next to points present the gvkey for identified influential 
observations. 
 
